Introduction
It has long been recognized that there are difficulties with economic agents selling potentially useful private information to others. Arrow (1962) and others have emphasized this problem in the context of marketing innovations.
A person who believes that she has valuable insights into how to produce something is unlikely to be able to exploit that information by offering to sell it to an existing firm. If she does not reveal her information before being paid, a firm may have little reason to believe she is truly well-informed. If she reveals information up front, the firm may simply use the information without compensating her. In this article, I present some formal models in which informed agents may gain control over productive assets as a response to such difficulties in selling, information. Although this general idea is a widespread intuition among economists, it has not been formally modeled within the framework of recent research on incomplete contracting and the theory of the firm. By modeling this issue formally, I help us consider more carefully the differing organizational implications of particular assumptions about the feasibility of revealing information and writing certain contracts. I also emphasize how features of the bargaining process help determine organizational design. The three main models presented here demonstrate some of the effects that different informational, contracting, and bargaining assumptions have on whether two parties will integrate, and, if they do, on who will obtain control over productive assets.
My models are developed within the Grossman-Hart-Moore (hereafter GHM) framework, which highlights the importance of control over assets in a world of incomplete contracts [see Grossman and Hart (1986) , Hart (1988) , and Hart and Moore (1990) ]. When contracts are inherently incomplete, problems arise, such as the unwillingness of some agents to take efficient actions that are privately costly, or owners skimming profits from their assets without compensating others who share those profits. The GHM approach predicts that assets will therefore be distributed so as to mitigate such agency problems. Expanding on the case of two individuals, the GHM approach can help provide some insight into organizational incentives more generally.
Whereas GHM focus on how assets will be distributed when moral hazard is present, I add to the framework the type of adverse selection that is natural when people try to convey information. By adding such ex ante informational problems, features of the bargaining process become more important than in the standard GHM framework. All of the models below examine strategic bargaining between a party that runs a factory and an outside party that may have information on how to use the factory more productively. Because of agency problems, it would be more efficient for the informed outside party to reveal her information without obtaining control of the factory. When the current owner cannot observe how informed an outside party is, however, I show that the outside party may have to buy the factory to make money from her private information. Indeed, I show that the more bargaining power an informed party has, the more likely she is to obtain control of an asset. Because I assume that production is inefficient if the informed party buys the factory, and because information is always revealed in equilibrium, in all the models below inefficiency occurs if and only if the informed party gains control of the factory.
Model 1 considers the case of "tacit knowledge": The outside party's information cannot be conveyed during the bargaining process, and to use her information, she must actually work with the current owner. This model applies to the situation where a well-informed firm (or its manager or owner) has detailed expertise on how another firm could be more productive. The well-informed firm can exploit its knowledge by either trying to become a consultant or subsidiary of the poorly informed firm, or it can do so by buying the assets of the poorly informed firm. Likewise, an entrepreneur with an idea on a new production technique could try to convince an existing firm to hire her as an employee, or she could build or buy a factory for herself. The results from Model 1 indicate that the well-informed firm may inefficiently gain control over a poorly informed firm, or an entrepreneur might inefficiently start her own business rather than work for others.
The tacit-knowledge assumption of Model 1 implies that the two parties will form one organization, and investigates only who will gain control over assets. Models 2 and 3 consider situations in which the informed party can readily describe her private information during bargaining. This allows us to consider whether the two parties will form one organization; they might instead do business through market exchange. These models capture such situations as when a supplier of some machine has private information on how firms can use that machine, or when a marketing firm has ideas on what products a manufacturer should produce. The supplier can reveal her information and sell her machine to the factory owner; the marketing firm can reveal its ideas on marketing and purchase the product from the manufacturing firm.
There is a trade-off for the outside party in revealing her information. If she reveals her private information during bargaining, she overcomes the adverseselection problem. But then the owner of the factory can produce without her, using the revealed information. Only if she can contribute to productivity even after revealing her information can she make profits. Thus, a supplier of machines will reveal uses for those machines only if it has a large advantage in supplying these machines; otherwise, a supplier will inefficiently obtain control over those assets used in production along with its machines. A marketing firm would reveal to manufacturers what products to produce only if it is in a unique position to distribute the product; otherwise, it will purchase the assets to produce the product itself, even if it is inefficient at production.
The models suggest, therefore, that firms are more likely to trade through markets when informed parties are also superior providers of productive services that are related to their information. If, on the other hand, information is a firm's only competitive advantage, it is likely to obtain control over assets, possibly by buying firms that currently own those assets.
In Section 2, I present a version of the GHM framework. I first show that efficient production depends on ownership of an asset when moral hazard exists-a basic result of the GHM literature. I then show that, if we impose the constraint that an informed outside agent earns more than an uninformed outside agent, efficient production also depends on ownership when adverse selection exists. Building from this basic framework of Section 2, I present Model 1 in Section 3, and Models 2 and 3 in Section 4.1 conclude in Section 5 with a discussion of some of the limitations of the three models. I also discuss a feature these models share with other adverse-selection models: Government regulation might in principle be able to improve efficiency, even if the government has no more information than any of the market agents. I discuss, however, how the potential for government remedy may be diminished once we abandon some of the strong assumptions I maintain throughout the article.
Asset Ownership, Moral Hazard, and Adverse Selection
In this section, I introduce a simple, reduced-form version of the GHM framework developed in Hart (1988) , and discussed in Holmstrom and Tirole (1989) .' This framework introduces the main informational assumptions driving the three main models presented below.
1. The models in these two articles are themselves simplified forms of the models developed in Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) , which, in turn, are part of the large recent formal literature inspired by the work of Coase (1937) and Williamson (1985) .
The GHM framework emphasizes the difficulties of specifying in contracts all relevant contingencies regarding the use of an asset. Ownership is therefore important because it determines who has residual rights of control in contingencies not explicitly contracted on. Within this framework, I illustrate the effects of the standard issue of moral hazard, and introduce the issue of adverse selection.
Consider the manager of a factory who can expend costly effort, and let e represent the cost of this effort. Suppose that there are two levels of effort: e = 0 means he does not work hard, e = e* > 0 means he does work hard. The revenues he generates, B(e), are greater when he works harder B(e*) = 1 and B(0) = 0. I am interested only in the case where the net benefits are greater from working harder. This occurs when e* < 1, so that B(e*) -e* > fl(0) -0 = 0.
If somebody other than the manager owned the factory, in a world of complete contracts she could write an incentive contract contingent on e. Assuming costless bargaining, nothing of economic consequence would be sensitive to whether or not the manager owns the factory, and full productive efficiency would occur regardless.
However, there are at least two problems in writing incentive contracts. First, effort by the manager is likely not to be verifiable in court; this assumption is familiar from the principal-agent literature.
2 Second, an owner of the factory can skim profits from an asset, where the courts can observe only those profits remaining after skimming. For instance, the owner might diminish a firm's profits by using the factory to enhance the profits of another firm he owns. It might be difficult to prove in court that the owner did this.
These issues can be formalized as follows. The manager first chooses his unverifiable effort level e, to produce profits B(e). The owner then chooses to skim off amount x from these profits. The court can observe neither the original profits nor how much is being skimmed off. Thus, n = B{e) -x represents the profits observed by the court. From skimming off amount x from the observable profits, the owner gets unobservable profits g-x, where «=s 1. If g < 1, then skimming profits means that total profits are lowered: If the owner diverts profits, she may lose some of them in the process. This is a reasonable assumption, because skimming is likely to be a second-best use of the asset. If g = 1, then an owner can perfectly extract all profits from the factory, rendering any incentive contracts ineffective. In the main models of the paper, I focus for simplicity on this extreme case of g = 1, but make subsidiary assumptions such that this simpler case mimics the case of g < 1.
For the remainder of this section, I outline the main features of the g < 1 case.
Only the observable profits n can be used as part of an incentive contract, so that a contract between the owner and manager is given by w{n). For any given such contract, and any given n, the owner will choose her optimal level 2. However, see Hermalin and Katz (1991) for a critique of how this assumption is used here and more generally. of skimming. Taking the incentive contract and the owner's behavior into account, the manager will choose his optimal level of effort. For simplicity, I assume here and throughout the paper that both parties are risk neutral.
Can an owner write an incentive contract that will induce the efficient level of effort by the manager? Consider a given contract w(ri) that gives the manager amount w{n) if observable profits are n. Will the manager set e = e*l Suppose the owner does not skim any of the profits. Then the manager will set e = e* only if w{\) -w(0) ^ e*. If this inequality holds, the owner's payoff will be 1 -w(l) if she chooses to not skim off any profits (setting x = 0). If she skims all of the profits away, setting x = 1, then her profits are g -w(0). Thus, the owner will skim if 1 -g < w(l) -w(0). If it is known that the owner will skim, then the manager will not put forth effort. In combination, this means that if 1 -g < e*, then an incentive contract inducing e = e* is impossible.
Thus, for high values of either gore*, the manager must own the factory in order for there to be efficient production-an incentive contract based on observable profits is not an adequate alternative. This basic insight from the GHM framework underlies all the models of this article: In a world of incomplete contracting, the efficiency of production depends on ownership of assets.
While the formal model presented here relates a situation of two individuals, I believe the general principles extend to larger organizations. Consider a case where an existing firm runs a factory, and an outside corporation is considering acquiring this firm as a subsidiary to continue production at the factory. Whatever the advantages of such an integration, there is likely to be some loss of efficiency in the day-to-day operations of the would-be subsidiary. For instance, if the firm being acquired had been managed by its owners, then integration will decrease the incentives of these managers, because they will no longer be the residual claimants of the profits they produce. Even if the managers did not own the firm, if they have an incentive scheme based on the firm's profits, this incentive scheme will become less effective if the firm is a subsidiary, because of difficulties of measuring the profits produced by a particular subsidiary within a corporation. Crudely put, we might guess that "agency costs" increase with the size of the firm. Of course, this does not imply the overall inferiority of larger organizations, and one of the implications of the models of this article is that integration of firms may be the only alternative for using information to improve productive efficiency.
Returning to the model, we can observe that, just as with moral hazard, adverse selection too can mean that asset ownership matters. Suppose agent R currently owns and manages a factory and, unlike the previous discussion, suppose that R can be productive at no effort: e* = 0. Consider an outside party Q that, if informed, can without effort improve productivity at the factory. However, suppose that only proportion p of outside parties are truly informed, and R cannot distinguish informed from uninformed outsiders. Assume that informed outsiders can add a value of 1 to production at the factory, and uninformed outsiders add no value.
In contrast to the moral-hazard case, there is an efficient incentive contract in which R owns the factory and hires Q as an employee. In particular, R could simply hire Q and promise her some very small percentage of the profits. Q will in fact reveal her information because this will costlessly increase profits, and-if g < 1-R will not be tempted to skim profits because this will reduce his profits.
Suppose, however, that informed outsiders must earn at least wages c, where c > 0, but uninformed outsiders would accept any contract yielding payoff greater than 0. That is, assume that the informed type of Q has a higher reservation wage than the uninformed type. This assumption will be justified in the next section as an endogenous outcome from bargaining; intuitively, an informed type of Q will try to extract some profits from her information.
Consider a "separating" incentive scheme where R offers to employ Q, such that only the informed type of agent Q would sign the contract. It must be that w(0) < 0 in order for the uninformed type of Q to be willing not to sign. In order for the informed type of Q to sign, it must be that the best she can do-revealing her information-will yield her greater than c. That is, w(l) S; c. But the contract must be incentive compatible for R if he is the owner. He must not have an incentive to skim profits. Thus, 1 -w{\) > g-\ -wifi) in order for ^? to be willing to pay the high wage. This means 1-js w(l) -u<0), whereas we need w(l) -w(0) > c to guarantee that informed types, and only informed types, will show up. So, when c + g > 1, there does not exist an efficient incentive contract that only informed types of Q would sign.
Consider the possibility that R hires both types of Q. Because Q need not apply effort to improve the productivity of the factory, it is easy to write an incentive contract to get the informed type to reveal her information, by paying her a small amount if profits are higher. Consider a contract such that R will not skim the profits. This means, if w(l) = c (the minimum wage that will attract an informed Q), then 1-c^j-H<0), SO that w(0) > c + g -1.
The expected cost to R of such a contract would be at least pc
1. This means that for very low values of p-also that there are very few informed Qs-no pooling contract could be signed when c + g > 1, which is when a separating contract is also impossible. Thus, when informed outsiders demand a premium above uninformed outsiders, for certain parameter values the only way to get efficient production in the case of adverse selection is for the outsider Q to gain control of the factory.
Just as in the earlier case of moral hazard, here too I believe that some of the insight can be scaled up. The managers of a corporation that have insights into how to make an existing firm more productive are likely to be able to use this information by having their corporation acquire the existing firm. In fact, even if the managers themselves do not have the improved information, there may be members of their current organization, such as a research division, that claim to have such ideas. Knowing this, they may still acquire the existing firm; if the managers of the corporation are much better informed about the quality of its own research division than are the managers of the existing firm, then functionally it is as if the corporate managers have the information themselves, because the same adverse-selection issues arise in trying to convince outsiders of the quality of the information.
A Model Combining Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
In the previous section, I showed each of two ways that asset ownership might be important for efficient production: (a) if there is moral hazard in a party R's effort, then he should own the factory; and (b) if there is adverse selection concerning the quality of a party Q's information, then she might have to buy a productive asset when informed in order to make more money than uninformed parties. The remaining models presented below combine these two issues, by considering the outcome when a "moral-hazard party" R bargains for control of a factory he currently owns with an outside "adverse-selection party" Q. Unlike the standard GHM model where assets are distributed efficiently (in the sense of constrained efficiency), I show that strategic bargaining factors might lead to an inefficient outcome.
The general framework for all the models is as follows. The manager and current owner, R, can run the factory by himself, choosing effort level e = e* to produce profits 1, or e = 0 to produce zero profits. As in Section 2, I assume that e* < 1, so that high effort is efficient. If an outsider, Q, is informed, then her information can increase productivity at the factory by amount b > 0. That is, with her information, total profits will be 1 + b if the manager sets e = e*, and b if the manager sets e = 0. If an outsider Q is not informed, then she cannot increase profits at the factory in any way. I assume that a single outsider presents herself to a manager R, and that R believes this outsider is informed with probability p.
We can formalize this information as follows. Q privately observes a signal from the set 5 = {s Q ,s t ,... ,s M }, where M is the number of potentially productive actions. She observes s 0 with probability I -p. For each k s 1, she observes s k with probability pIM. These signals give Q information about the set of potentially productive actions, A = {a l ,a 2 ,...,a M }. Action a,-is productive in state s it and is unproductive in all other states (no action in A is productive in state s 0 ). Thus, Q is uninformed in state s 0 , and is informed in all other states. I assume that R observes none of these signals, and that M is so large that he essentially has no information about which action in A is productive.
The manager's effort e* is productive in all states of nature. Therefore, total productivity at the factory in state Sj can be represented by nie.a^sj) = 1 + bia,,Sj) if e -e*, and Ji(e, a j.Sj) = bia^sp if e = 0, where bia,,sj) = b if; = j, and bia^sj) = 0 if / ^ j.
In Section 2,1 showed that writing contracts on observable profits may not be a fully adequate substitute for complete contracting; the owner of the factory could skim x dollars of observable profits to receive g-x in unobservable profits. In the models below, I use the extreme case that g = 1, so that it is impossible to contract on profits at all, because the owner can costlessly skim off all of the profits. This extreme case is used for notational and analytic ease, but it causes a problem. If g < 1, then R, as owner, can provide the incentive for Q to truthfully reveal her private information by giving her so small a percentage of profits that he will not skim. With g = 1, however, no incentives are feasible, and Q will be indifferent between revealing her information and not doing so. I will therefore simply assume that Q will reveal information when she has no strict incentive not to.
Note, by contrast, that if Q owns the factory and tries to hire R, R would never be willing to engage in costly effort. In other words, if Q buys the factory, then efficient production will not take place. This, in fact, is the only relevant source of inefficiency in the models presented in this article, so inefficiency occurs if and only if Q gains control of the factory. Therefore, my central focus in what follows is whether Q gains control.
3
In Model 1,1 assume that contracting on information-and even conveying information-are impossible during bargaining. In this case, the only viable option is for one of the two parties to own the factory, and possibly to hire the other party. Model 1 applies naturally to the question of whether an innovative firm will take over a noninnovative firm. Attempts to specify exactly what a noninnovative firm should do to improve its profits are likely to be infeasible. The ideas often may be too complicated to write out completely and are perhaps contingent on particular unforeseen circumstances. Thus, conveying such "tacit knowledge" during bargaining is likely to be difficult; the only way to exploit the information may be for the informed party to form a longterm relationship with those working at the factory.
When g = 1, the only choice open to the agents is to determine ownership and a fixed transfer of money to the nonowner. R can remain the owner of the factory and hire Q at a set wage w, or Q can buy the factory along with the manager's services for price P.
I assume that R and Q are bilateral monopolists, and consider a very stylized bargaining structure: Agent Q first makes a contract offer to either buy the factory or work for R. R can then either accept or reject the contract offer. If he accepts it, production and trade under its terms begin immediately. If he rejects the offer, he can either begin production immediately without Q or he can make a counteroffer. If Q rejects the counteroffer, R can choose to produce on his own or to not produce. If Q accepts, then the parties produce according to their contract. Importantly, if production does not occur until after a counteroffer by R, then the payoffs to both agents are discounted by d.
The features of Model 1 are summarized below.
Model 1 (i) Q makes an offer to buy the factory for price P, or to work for R at wage w.
(ii) R accepts or rejects the offer. If he accepts, trade takes place, and production occurs, with R choosing effort level if he retains control.
(iii) If R rejects Q's offer, R can make a counteroffer or choose to operate the factory alone.
(iv) Q accepts or rejects R's offer. If Q rejects the offer, then R can choose to operate the factory alone, or not operate. If Q accepts the offer, production takes place under the terms of the contract, with R choosing effort level if he controls the factory. In either case, payoffs are discounted by factor 6 if production occurs in this period.
The parameter <5 represents bargaining power in this context. The higher <5 is, the more bargaining power R has, because he can with little costly delay make a final take-it-or-leave-it offer. If d is low, then he must be willing to greatly diminish total profits in order to get this final offer.
4 Models 1-3 will aU be dynamic, incomplete-information games, so that perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) is an appropriate solution concept. As is often the case, however, PBE does not narrowly determine the outcome. Moreover, in the models defined here, standard signaling refinements such as Cho and Kreps's (1987) "Intuitive Criterion" will not restrict the set of possible outcomes. The results I present, therefore, do not rely on invoking such refinements. I shall, however, focus only on PBEs that meet two further types of restrictions, which I summarize by Assumptions 1 and 2. Assumption 1 contains restrictions that are needed solely for the convenience of avoiding more complicated models; with slight modification of the model, these restrictions would not be necessary for any results. Assumption 2 imposes behavioral restrictions that I believe are quite appropriate in the context of the model. 4. I believe the main results of this article would (qualitatively) hold under more realistic bargaining structures. One possible concern much discussed in the literature on contract negotiations is the possibility of renegotiation. For instance, will not Agent Q buy the asset and, once she has proved that she is informed, sell the asset back to R, thus avoiding the agency costs? The problem with this is that if Q could truly cam profits on her information by doing thus, then she could do so even if she is uninformed.
An anonymous referee has also pointed out to me that the bargaining structure is restrictive in that it does not allow, for instance, Q to offer a menu of choices to R in the first round, so that R can choose to accept any one of many possible contracts. In mixed-strategy equilibria, there can be partial separation of informed from uninformed types, allowing for somewhat more efficiency than in the models presented here.
Issues of renegotiation and complexity of the bargaining process are notoriously intricate. While I believe these should be explored, I conjecture that while the inefficiency result might be mitigated, there is little reason to believe that it could be eliminated in general, or that the broad comparative statics of this article would be fundamentally changed.
5. A general approach to incorporating "behavioral" restrictions into solution concepts is outlined in Rabin (1992) , and models such as Cho (1992) and Rabin (1990) apply similar ideas in making stronger yet more realistic predictions in game-theoretic models. The general idea is that game theorists and economists should not shy away from making restrictions beyond those The first part of Assumption 1 was discussed above, but all parts are needed only because of the assumption that g = 1.
Assumption 1. If an informed Q signs a contract in which she is indifferent between revealing her information and not doing so, she reveals her information; if she is indifferent between signing a contract and not signing it, she will sign it. If an uninformed Q is indifferent between accepting a contract and not doing so, she rejects it.
Assumption 2 imposes more substantial behavioral restrictions. Suppose Q makes a contract offer that, if accepted by R, would yield the same expected payoff to each informed type of Q. Assumption 2 says that R places equal probability on each of those types making the offer. This rules out R believing (out of equilibrium) that he knows exactly which type of Q would offer to buy a factory, and thus deterring all types from offering to buy the factory. Because I am attempting to model the idea that R is uninformed, it seems natural to eliminate equilibria in which R threatens to learn information when Q behaves in a way that has no natural relationship to her private information.
Assumption 2. Suppose Q makes a contract offer that, if accepted, would yield Q of each type s k , k > 1, the same expected payoff. Then R puts equal probability on each of those types making the offer.
I now consider the basic results from Model 1. In this and the other models, it will be useful to use the variable h = 1 -e*; h can be thought of as the agency costs of having Q own the asset rather than R.
, then in any PBE meeting Assumptions 1 and 2, Q buys the asset if she is informed, and R operates the asset without Q if Q is uninformed. Furthermore, such a PBE exists.
The proofs of all results are in the Appendix. The intuition behind Result 1.1 is as follows. If R is certain that Q is informed after seeing an offer by Q to buy the factory, then his payoff by rejecting the offer is Max [h,d(b + h) ]-his payoff from either producing on his own, or from making the counteroffer that Q works for him at wage w = 0. This payoff will be even lower if he is less certain that Q is informed, so that any offer to buy the factory for P > Max [h,d(b + h) ] will be accepted by R. Thus, if Q is informed, she can dictated by rationality, so long as these restrictions are both behaviorally well-grounded and consistent with rationality.
6. Recall that in Section 2 1 assumed that 0 < e* < 1, which implies that 0 < h < 1. Thus, I am considering only those cases for which moral hazard is a problem, and for which high effort is more efficient than low effort. In general, e* can be interpreted as the level of effort that is most efficient, so that the important assumption is essentially that minimal effort is not the most efficient. What is the best an informed Q can do by offering to work for R? If she offers to work at wage w, R will anticipate that the uninformed types of Q are also making this offer, because they too would earn money by doing so. His expected payoff from accepting the offer would be pb + h -w if he were certain that all of the informed types of Q would also make the offer, and less if he thought they would not. Therefore, R would accept such an offer only if pb + h -W s Max [h,d(pb + h) ]. Therefore, the most that the informed type could get by offering to work for R is w ^ pb + h -Max [h,d(pb + h) ]. If this is smaller than the payoff from buying the factory, she will buy the factory, yielding Result 1.1.
If b < Max [h,d(b + h) ], then R would reject any offers to buy the factory that gave Q positive profits, so that Q will never gain control of the factory. This yields Results 1.2. Results 1.1 and 1.2 together provide a range where the informed types of Q will always buy the asset, a range where they never will, and a range where either outcome is possible. Figure 1 summarizes these results. For all combinations of p and 5 in the intermediate range, where neither Result 1.1 nor 1.2 holds, there are two types of equilibria. In one equilibrium, an offer by Q to work for R is interpreted by R to mean that Q is uninformed. If this is the case, the only way for the informed Q to make any money is to buy the factory, so she will offer to buy the factory. This equilibrium is essentially the same as the equilibrium in the "Q buys" region. In the other type of equilibrium, offers to work for R are interpreted as being made by both the informed and uninformed types, so the informed Q will be willing to work for R in this range. In this equilibrium, Q's share of the increased profits due to the alleviation of moral hazard outweighs the loss in her wages from the fact that uninformed outsiders are also being employed. This equilibrium is essentially the same as that in the "R retains control" region.
Results 1.1 and 1.2 yield some interesting comparative statics. Consider 6. When 6 is close to 1, agent R has most of the bargaining power. When it is close to 0, agent Q has the bargaining power. Result 1.2 shows that when R has practically all of the bargaining power, then Q will never buy the factory no matter how severe the adverse-selection problem: Result 1.2 is independent of the value of p. Intuitively, the reason that Q buys the factory is that she cannot otherwise signal that she is informed. However, buying the factory is always less efficient in terms of total profits, because R will certainly set e equal to 0. If R has all the bargaining power, then he can extract all the surplus, and, unlike the informed Q, he will receive his highest payoff when total expected profits are maximized. Because these total profits exceed the most Q can compensate him in buying the factory, Q will not even try to buy the factory from R.
In terms of our earlier example, if an innovator approaches a firm with ideas for improved production, whether or not she acquires the firm will depend in part on her bargaining power. If the innovator has little bargaining power, then she will not acquire the firm but will relay the information by working for the firm, as an employee or as a consultant. If she has extensive bargaining power (including the means to buy the firm), then she might acquire the firm as the best way to exploit her information.
Consider p, the probability that agent Q is informed. If p is low, then the adverse-selection problem is severe, so Q is more likely to buy the factory. Indeed, as p is lower, the range of values for the other parameters for which Result 1.1 holds becomes unambiguously larger. That is, if adverse selection is severe, then the only way for an outsider that truly is informed to take advantage of her information is to acquire the firm.
If p is close to 1, then adverse selection is not a severe problem. However, there still exists an equilibrium in which Q cannot earn any profit except by offering to buy the factory no matter how high p is. If it becomes expected in markets that informed Qs will always offer to buy the factory, then any offer to sell information will automatically signal that Q is uninformed and will be rejected, so the expectations will be fulfilled. In this type of equilibrium, adverse selection-no matter how mild-can cause inefficient purchase of the asset, so long as the conditions of Result 1.2 do not hold.
Essentially, this type of equilibrium holds if a potential innovator is quite easily identified as truly being well-informed, with only the slightest suspicion that she is an impostor. Firms, however, decide that no matter how confident they originally were that an outsider is informed, the outsider's unwillingness to purchase the firm is a sure signal that the outsider is actually not informed. If this view is known to potential innovators, then they will in fact purchase the firm if they are well-informed. This result suggests that the potential for inefficient control of resources by informed parties is a possibility even in a world in which people and organizations can almost perfectly signal the quality of their information.
Changes in h also have an intuitive effect. If h is increased-so that the moral-hazard problem of having R work for Q becomes more severe-then the range of parameter values for which Result 1.1 holds is smaller, and the range for which Result 1.2 holds is larger. Roughly speaking, Q is less likely to buy the factory. This is a straightforward result of the fact that the inefficiency of production is very much a factor in determining who gains control over production, and is not always offset by strategic or informational issues.
Two More Models
Model 1 does not involve any strategic decisions by Q as to whether to reveal her information during bargaining; I assumed she was not able to do so. Because of this assumption of tacit knowledge, there was no way the parties could transfer information without developing a long-term relationship. Within the framework being used here, such a long-term relationship could only take the form of one party or the other obtaining complete control over the factory. Thus, 1 concluded in the example of an innovative firm and a noninnovative firm that the outcome must be the integration of the two firms. In Models 2 and 3, I assume that Q can easily make claims about her private information. The ability to convey information during bargaining raises the possibility that, instead of the parties "integrating," they could profitably transfer information without forming one organization. Thus, whereas Model 1 emphasized mostly which party gains control when they integrate, the models presented in this section consider the possibility of nonintegration.
Given the limited ability to profit from information, why might an informed party reveal useful information during bargaining? The answer lies in the possibility that the informed party might be able to contribute in some way besides her information; Q might reveal her information during bargaining, and then solicit payment for her noninformational productive abilities.
8 If those abilities are valuable enough, she may be willing to reveal her information during bargaining. If, on the other hand, her information is her only productive advantage, revealing it would mean that she could not extract any profits from the situation.
8. The possibility of such additional productivity was not relevant in Model 1 because we assumed that there was no way that the outside party could convey any of the necessary information without integrating.
Though I assume in Model 2 that information can be conveyed, I maintain the assumption that whether productive information has been conveyed between parties is not readily verifiable by courts, and thus cannot be directly contracted upon. Therefore, Q cannot (without becoming owner of the factory) directly receive the profits from an action R takes at her suggestion.
A natural example to which Model 2 applies is that of a potential supplier to a firm who has an idea on how that firm can improve its productivity. The supplier suggests, perhaps, that the firm can use a machine in such a way that had not occurred to the firm. If the supplier has a relative advantage over others in building this machine, then a plausible option for the supplier is to just give the information to R, and then make profits from sales of the machine.
Alternatively, she can attempt to make money from her information as well, by either buying the firm or offering to work for the firm. In contrast to what I shall assume in Model 3, an informed party in this case would be unable to contract directly on the increased profits of the firm resulting from her suggestion. In particular, a supplier of a machine will not likely be able to enforceably contract with a firm terms that specify "If you use this machine in the way I suggested, then you should give me a certain proportion of the profits due to the use of this machine."
If the supplier makes a claim about how the firm can improve its productivity, the firm might not be able to tell whether the supplier's suggestion is truly productive without considerable investment. Alternatively, mentioning an idea may make it immediately obvious that using the machine is a good idea. To capture how readily a firm can confirm the value of information, I shall denote the cost of verifying a claim by the parameter d, where d s 0.
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In this and the next model, the variable k represents the additional productivity of Q beyond her information alone. Agent Q can either buy the factory or contract to provide a service a to R that is productive only if R performs the productive section a,-£ A. The total productivity of the factory can be written as JI(SJ) = 1 + b{a it Sj) if e = e* and JI^SJ) = b(a,,Sj) if e = 0. The function b\a t ,sj) equals 0 if; ¥" j, equals b if i = j and Q performs action a, and equals b -k if i = j and Q does not perform action a. Thus, k is the additional productivity of Q performing task a if she is informed. Once R becomes informed, he can make profits b -k without Q.
The features of Model 2 are summarized below.
Model 2 (i) Q makes an offer to buy the factory for price P, or she makes an offer to work for R at wage w, or she states that some action a ( G A is productive and offers to perform activity d for a fixed price.
In principle, R could research all states of nature at expected cost (dM -d)/2 (recall that
M is the number of potentially productive actions) to determine which action is productive. As I have assumed throughout this article, M is quite large, so that such research is not a plausible option when starting from total ignorance, even if d is very low. In this model, d serves essentially to characterize how verifiable are claims by Q.
(ii) R accepts or rejects the offer. If he accepts, trade takes place, and production occurs, with R choosing effort level if he maintains control.
(iv) Q accepts or rejects R's offer. If Q rejects the offer, then R can choose to operate the factory alone, or not operate. If Q accepts the offer, production takes place under the terms of the contract, with R choosing effort level if he controls the factory. In either case, payoffs are discounted by factor <5 if production occurs in this period.
Because the agents cannot directly contract on the profits of the factory, their only choice is to determine ownership of the factory and contract on the performance of the activities directly. Most importantly, if Q does not buy the factory, then she can still sell her services a. It will turn out that the agents will never want to contract directly on the actions a ; G A in this model, because they cannot contract on the profits these actions produce.
I focus on the case where p is low. This means that the adverse-selection problem is severe, and the option of Q working for R becomes unrealistic, because the wage would have to reflect the overwhelming probability that Q is uninformed. When p is close to 0, the essential question therefore becomes whether Q will reveal her information during bargaining, or buy the factory.
Result 2.1 gives sufficient conditions for Q to purchase the asset.
, then there exists a p such that, for all p < p, in any PBE meeting Assumptions 1 and 2, the informed types of Q buy the factory. Furthermore, such a PBE exists.
The intuition for Result 2.1 is as follows. Suppose Q makes a claim that some activity, a t £ A, is productive, and offers to perform action a for price P. Will R accept such an offer? There cannot be an equilibrium in which R accepts the offer without researching, because then all the uninformed types would make the claim as well. Thus, in order for R to be willing to accept the offer, he must be willing both to do research and to purchase a if the information is verified.
If R does the research, and confirms Q's claim, then he would not be willing to pay more than P such that b + h -P> Max [Z> + h -k,5{b + h) ], because R can get b + h -k by producing on his own (with his newly acquired information), or get 6{b + h) by making a counteroffer for Q to work for him. Therefore, the most Q can get for her information is P < Min[<t,(l -6){b + h)]. However, R must be willing to research the possibility to begin with, which he will not do if d is too high. lfb + h-P -d< Max [h,d(b + h)] , then R will not research. This means that R will not pay more than
Together, these conditions mean that Q cannot make profits P > Min [b -d,k,(l -S) 
(b + h) -d] from revealing her information and
selling a. Thus, she will buy the factory if it yields her (positive) profits greater than Min [b -d,k,(l ~ d) 
Result 2.2 is the same as Result 1.2, and is true for the same reasons: Under the conditions specified, Q cannot make any profits by buying the factory. [h,d(h + b) ], then in any PBE, R owns the factory.
Result 2.2. lfb< Max
These results allow several comparative statics. First, if d is very large, Result 2.1 reduces to Result 1.1 where p is low. That is, the fact that Q can make claims about her private information does not really matter if those claims cannot be verified at a reasonable cost. Such offers by Q do not circumvent the adverse-selection problem, because Q could just pretend to have information she does not have. A supplier that tells a firm that its machine can be used to make a great new product, but cannot prove to the firm that the machine is really useful for that function, is in essentially the same situation as in Model 1-that of not being able to convey the information at all. If d is low, then R can confirm claims by Q relatively cheaply. Even here, however, credible information revelation cannot be guaranteed. If R believes that any informational claims are made by an uninformed Q, then he might not bother to investigate the option no matter how low d is. Thus, for d > 0, it is always possible that Q does not reveal her information. Note, for instance, that Result 2.2 corresponds to Result 1.2: Although it expands the range over which R might retain control, the extra option of informationrevelation does not at all expand the range over which R surely retains control of the factory.
An important parameter in this model is k, which is the portion of Q's potential productive contribution that is not information. If k is close to b, then even if Q reveals her information, R still wants to work with Q. If k is very low, however, then revealing her information would make Q of minimal importance to R. This is the case, for instance, if a supplier can suggest the use of a certain machine at a firm, but cannot produce the machine more cheaply than can other suppliers.
Suppose k = 0. Result 2.1 in this case reduces to the condition that Q will always buy the factory if b -Max[/i,<5(£ + h)] > 0, which is the same as Result 1.1 when p is low. This is because if Q makes herself superfluous by revealing her information, her information is of no strategic use. Note that, if k = 0, Result 2.1 is the opposite of Result 2.2-for almost all parameter values, we can predict unambiguously whether Q or R will control the factory.
When k = b, Q is needed even when she reveals her information. If d is small, so that the cost of verifying a claim by Q is small, then Result 2.1 reduces to b -Max [h,d(b + h) 
, both of which are always false. That is, when k = b, there is always an equilibrium where Q reveals her private information and makes a contract offer, and R verifies the information and accepts the offer. This way, the agents are able to achieve full efficiency, and Q does not lose any of her strategic bargaining power in the process. 10 If a firm is the only potential supplier of a machine and it has some information on how that machine can moderately increase a manufacturer's profits, it will reveal that information to the manufacturer so as to sell its machine.
But this happy outcome is never guaranteed. If R always assumes informational claims by Q will be false, he will not bother to research them and will reject Q's offers. As the model is specified, so long as d > 0 there is no guarantee that information will be revealed before a contract is signed (though for the range where Result 2.2 applies, efficiency is guaranteed by Q working for R without obtaining control).
This problem would be alleviated if Q could somehow offer to subsidize the verification process of R. This might be difficult, however. Another possibility is that Q can directly verify the information for R. This might occur, for instance, when a potential supplier conveys to a manufacturer detailed and convincing data on productive new ways the manufacturer can use the supplier's machines. If either of these were possible, the results of this model would be more like those of Model 3, to which I now turn.
Model 3 is identical to Model 2, except that specific contracts between the parties are possible: Q can costlessly contract to have R take any action a t G A and, most importantly, can receive profits from the action. That is, the two parties can write a contract such that Q pays R some amount/ if and only if R performs the activity a,, and then Q gets to keep profits generated by the performance of the activity a t . In the example of a supplier discussed in connection to Model 2, this would mean that the supplier could have a contract with terms specifying "If the firm produces product X with my machine, I will compensate the firm by amount f it and I will keep the profits from selling the product."
A more plausible example meeting the assumptions of Model 3 would be a marketing firm that has information on what product a manufacturer should produce. The marketing firm is likely to be able to contract directly on the delivery of the product, which it can then distribute and collect profits on.
Q can thus pay R to perform some a,-G A and receive the profits b(a,s). This permits R to retain control of the factory, so that he can earn the profits on the action e*. In this case, the willingness to pay for an action can eliminate the adverse-selection problem. Q would not be willing to purchase specific services from R unless she knew those actions would produce profits for her. This has the same signaling feature as when Q offers to buy the factory from R: Only informed agents would be willing to do so. A marketing firm, for instance, would not contract to buy some product from another firm unless it believed that that product would be profitable.
The marketing firm may or may not be better at distributing the product as well. If it is no better at distributing than the manufacturing firm would be, then it cannot simply offer a contract for the good. The manufacturer would reject the offer, and produce by itself.
Formally, we again let the variable k represent the noninformational productivity of Q. Agent Q can either buy the factory or contract to provide a service a to R that is productive only if R performs the productive action Oj £ A. Or-unlike in Model 2-Q can pay R to perform action a, G A and receive the profits bia^Sj). The total productivity of the factory is the same as in Model 2: TI{SJ) = 1 + Ha^sJ) if e = e* and n^sj) = bia^sj) if e = 0. The function b\a t ,Sj) equals 6 if / ^ j, equals b if i = j and Q performs action a, and equals b -k if i = j and Q does not perform action a. Thus, k is the additional productivity of Q performing task a. if she is informed. Once R becomes informed, he can make profits b -k without Q.
The features of Model 3 are summarized below.
Model 3 (i) Q makes an offer to buy the factory for price P, or she makes an offer to work for R at wage w, or she states that some action a t G A is productive and offers to perform activity a for a fixed price, or she offers to pay R a price for performing some activity a s G A.
(ii) R accepts or rejects the offer. If he accepts, trade takes place and production occurs, with R choosing effort level if he maintains control.
(iv) Q accepts or rejects R's offer. If Q rejects the offer, then R can choose to operate the factory alone, or not operate. If Q accepts the offer, production takes place under the terms of the contract, with R choosing effort level if he controls the factory. In either case, payoffs are discounted by factor d if production occurs in this period. Because in this model Q can offer specific contracts for the performance of action a v revealing the information and offering to perform action a would never be an attractive alternative. This would entail R having to verify at cost d whether Q's claim is true before agreeing to the contract. If Q offers to purchase service a t from R, no such research cost is incurred.
For instance, suppose a marketing firm claimed to a manufacturer that producing a certain product would be profitable, and offered to distribute this product. If the marketing firm did not itself take responsibility for the profits from distributing this good, it would not convince the manufacturer that it truly knew the product to be profitable. The manufacturer would either reject the offer or do costly research as to the marketability of the proposed good. A clearly preferable option would be for the marketing firm to promise ahead of time to buy the product, so that the manufacturer would not have to worry about the adverse selection, and would not have to research the good's mar-ketability itself; it would be compensated even if the good were not profitable.
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Essentially, unlike in Models 1 and 2, there is an opportunity for the informed party to become residual claimant of the profits produced by an activity she believes to be productive without gaining control over the asset. The main results from Model 3 reflect the fact that the severity of the adverseselection problem will thus be mitigated.
, then there exists p such that, if/? < p, then in any PBE meeting Assumptions 1 and 2, the informed type of Q buys the factory. Furthermore, such a PBE exists.
, then in any PBE R retains control of the factory, and, if Q is informed, the efficient action is performed.
Result 3.1 is the same as Result 2.1 when d is low, and the proof is similar. Q, if informed, can offer to purchase the task a, G A, which she knows to be productive, and can earn profits of Min[)fc,(l -d) (b + h) ]. Alternatively, she can make profits of b -Max [h,d(b + h) } by offering to purchase the factory.
In Result 3.2, unlike in Result 2.2, R is guaranteed to retain control of the factory because Q can be sure that R will accept a specific contract if she is willing to reveal her information. Q's willingness to make specific contract offers means that she pays R a fixed amount regardless of the profitability of the task, so R would never reject such a contract out of fear that Q is uninformed. Thus, Q will choose between revealing her information, or preserving it through buying the factory. Unlike the two previous models, there exists a unique equilibrium for all but a zero-measure set of parameter values.
Result 3.2 guarantees that if k is close enough to b, then R will definitely maintain control of the asset: It can be shown that if k = b, the conditions of Result 3.2 always hold if h > 0. This means that if Q is still needed even after information is revealed, then there is no reason for Q to purchase the asset. A firm with a lucrative monopoly on marketing goods will always reveal to manufacturers any moderately profitable ideas it has on production, and will never inefficiently gain control over factories.
Suppose on the other hand that k is low. If Q offers a specific contract, then R can reject it and produce on his own. Thus, despite her ability to overcome the adverse selection, Q may inefficiently buy the asset. If k = 0, Result 3.1 reduces to the condition that Q buys the factory if b > Max|7j,<5(fc + h)]. In this case, if Q has most of the bargaining power, she will purchase the factory. Note, however, that Result 3.1 holds for only low values of p. If there were no problem with adverse selection to begin with, then Q may prefer to work for R rather than buy the asset. Again we see that, if the adverse-selection problem is not too severe, there will not be inefficient control of assets. If a marketing firm is well-known to have good ideas, then (under the extreme assumptions of the model) it will be efficiently purchased by a manufacturer to distribute goods.
We have seen that the adverse-selection problem is somewhat mitigated in Model 3 relative to Models 1 and 2 because of the assumption that the informed party can both convey its private information and write contracts contingent on this information. Yet the basic adverse-selection problem discussed at the beginning of this paper is not fully mitigated-an informed party will still be somewhat reluctant to reveal her information during bargaining. By doing so, she loses much of her bargaining power and thus she cannot fully take advantage of her superior information.
Discussion
The models described here have employed rather stylized assumptions to focus on some basic issues regarding the role of private information in determining the organization of production. As such, these models have obviously omitted some important issues. For instance, both because of the limitations of the GHM framework, and because of the extreme version of the framework employed here, I have ignored many complicated relational contracts available to economic agents. As discussed in Williamson (1985) and other recent research, long-term contracts such as franchising and joint ventures mix some of the features of market exchange with some of the features of internal organizations. Some such contracts might have advantages in solving the information problems I have discussed here. For instance, well-informed distributors might develop exclusive contracts with manufacturers to market certain products; this might plausibly both mitigate some of the agency problems and provide some incentives for the distributors to reveal their superior information to manufacturers.
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The possibility of long-term relationships between organizations also highlights the role that reputation might play in mitigating informational prob-
12. An example of a more complicated relational contract that I have excluded appears in Model 3. In the bargaining structure there, I allowed only specific contracts and ruled out what we might call explicit authority contracts. An explicit authority contract designates that Q gets to demand that R perform some action from some range of actions in A, with compensation perhaps contingent on which action R is requested to perform. An example of this type of contract is a requirements contract: One firm obtains the right to request delivery of any amount of a good from a range specified in the contract, where the compensation schedule is also specified in the contract. The potential advantage of an explicit authority contract is that it allows Q to offer a contract that does not suffer from the agency costs of her controlling the factory, while not fully revealing her private information. Perhaps, for instance, a marketing firm could bargain for the right to demand any product from a manufacturer at a fixed price, so long as that product can clearly be produced by the manufacturer at a given cost. Offering such a contract will not reveal to the manufacturer what product it is that would be profitable.
lems. In the example of an innovative firm trying to benefit from its ideas, one option is for that firm to become a consulting firm serving many customers. Indeed, while I have emphasized the possibility that an uninformed firm might hire innovative individuals as employees, it is often more natural to suppose that they will hire them as consultants. While the profits of consultants might be limited for precisely the reasons indicated in Model 1, these problems can be mitigated by reputation.
The implications of my models are also heavily influenced by the assumption that informed parties suffer from none of the moral-hazard problems that uninformed parties do. This assumption clearly exaggerates the feasibility in all of the models of R gaining control over Q; just as a supplier buying a manufacturer may decrease the incentives for the manufacturer, so too a manufacturer buying a supplier is likely to decrease the incentives for the supplier.
The models also rely on the assumption that the informed party cannot be productive without the uninformed party. With this assumption, I have been able to ignore the possibility that the informed party could enter an industry as a separate firm and compete with the incumbent uninformed party. Even if in equilibrium such entry never occurred, the threat of doing so by the informed party would surely strengthen her bargaining power.
All these simplifications also mean that the normative implications of the models are exaggerated. In the models presented here, there are potential inefficiencies in market allocation of control over assets. 13 Such inefficiency arises because of adverse selection (though some of the models suggest it may arise no matter how small the adverse-selection problem). And, as with adverse-selection models in general, the results open the door for the possibility that government intervention could enhance efficiency, even if the government has no more information than any of the relevant parties.
14 Suppose, for instance, that marketing firms are generally well-informed, in strong bargaining positions, and have little to contribute besides their information. Then Model 3 indicates that they will buy factories and produce goods internally; but it would be more efficient for them to buy products from separately run manufacturers. The government would therefore improve productive efficiency by disallowing integration between marketing firms and manufacturers.
Yet there are many reasons why such efficiency-enhancing intervention may 13. These conclusions relate to some of the arguments made by Marglin (1974 Marglin ( , 1984 , which have been debated widely [see, for instance, Landes (1986) ]. Marglin argues that capitalists, in order to profit from their private information, might seek control over workers, even in situations where it would be more efficient for the workers to have control. If we see "bosses" (to use Marglin's term) as having know-how, then my models imply that they might establish inefficient hierarchical relationships. Of course, all the critiques discussed in the text apply. Most notably, such a government policy would decrease the incentives to "bosses'* to become informed about productive possibilities.
14. Aghion and Hermalin (1990) similarly conclude that the government can increase efficiency by banning certain contracts between entrepreneurs and investors. be implausible in practice. For instance, the efficacy of such intervention relies on the questionable assumption that the government could identify those situations where integration is occurring for "informational" rather than efficiency reasons. Probably a more important limitation of the models presented here is the assumption that economic agents are exogenously informed. More realistically, parties in the economy are informed because of efforts they have taken to become informed. Distributors gain insight into marketing through costly marketing research. Innovative firms tend to be those firms that spend more on research and development. The fact that parties become informed through their own efforts would probably not radically alter many of this article's descriptive results; after parties become informed, the issues examined here will come into play. But this endogeneity will fundamentally change the welfare effects of government intervention. When parties are capable of investing in better information, being informed is determined by incentives. A government policy of decreasing the profits of those parties that are wellinformed would probably decrease the level of innovation in the economy.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Result 1.1
Consider an offer by Q in period 1 to buy the asset and R's services for price
If R accepts this offer, he will receive a payoff of P. If he rejects it, he can receive h by producing alone, or he can make a counteroffer.
The best R can do by a counteroffer, given that he believes he is facing an informed type of Q, is to hire only the informed type at wage = 0. This will yield him b + h -O = b + h. Discounted, this will yield 5{b + h). Thus, if P > Max [h,d(b + h) ], R will accept the offer to sell the asset.
I must now show that there does not exist an equilibrium that will yield Q a higher expected payoff than b -Max [h,d(b + h) ]. Clearly if Q does not make an offer that is accepted with positive probability, then her expected payoffs are zero. And R will not accept any offer to sell the asset for P < Max [h,d(b + h) ]. Thus, the only possible equilibria in which Q gets higher payoffs are those where she makes an offer to work for R, and where R accepts such a contract with positive probability.
Suppose Q offers to work for R at wage = w. Suppose R attributes probability = q that Q is informed. Then he will accept the offer only ifq-b + hw > Max [h,6(qb + h) 
Let t(w) be the probability that R will accept an offer of wage w. Let W be the set of wages that R accepts with positive probability. Let W* • = {W* G argmax^u, t(w)-w}. Then if Q is uninformed, she will make a specific offer at some w G W**. Thus, for at least one such contract offer, q < p.
Thus, R will accept that contract offer only if w < pb + h -Max [h,d(pb + h) }. But, by assumption,
so that an informed Q can guarantee a higher payoff by buying the factory than she can get from any such wage contract offer. Therefore, in a PBE, q = 0 from that contract offer, so that if w > 0, then R will not accept the contract offer with positive probability, contradicting the definition of W**.
Thus, in any PBE meeting Assumptions 1 and 2, Q offers to buy the factory if she is informed. To prove the second part, we must find such a PBE. It is the following. If Q is informed, she offers to buy the factory for P = Max [h,d(b + h) ]. If she is uninformed, she makes no contract offer and accepts none. R's strategy is to sell the factory for any P > Max [h,d(b + h) Suppose there exists a PBE in which Q sometimes buys the factory at price = P. If P > 0, the uninformed type will never make such an offer if there is positive probability that it will be accepted. Thus, in any PBE, R must believe that only informed types of Q will make such an offer if he accepts the offer. If R believes Q is informed, he will not accept an offer if P < Max [h,d(b + h) ]. But if P < Max [h,d(b + h) ], then the informed Q will get payoff b -P. But b -P < b -Max [h,d(b + h) ] < 0, so she will not make this offer.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Result 2.1 R must accept any offer to buy the factory for price P < Max[/i,<5(/i + b)], as argued in Proof of Result 1.1. Also, as shown in Proof of Result 1.1, as p -* 0, the maximum wage Q could get for working for R goes to 0. Thus, if b -Max[h,d(b + h) ) > 0, there exists a p such that buying the factory is strictly preferred by Q. What is the best Q could conceivably do in a PBE by revealing her information and offering to perform task d? Suppose that there is a positive probability that R accepts some such offer without doing research first. Then, since there exists no PBE meeting Assumptions 1 and 2 such that Q can work at a positive wage, all the uninformed types would pool into some such offer. Therefore, there must exist some offer at price P such that the proportion of the claims that are true is no greater than p(l + \IM). Thus, the expected utility to R of accepting the offer without doing research is less than or equal top(l + \IM)(Jb + 1) -e* -P, which, forp small enough, is negative. So, for p small enough, there cannot exist a PBE where R accepts any offers without researching them all of the time.
Suppose Q makes a claim and offers to perform d at price P. Then R can reject the offer outright and collect Max [h,d((q + r)b + h) ], where q is the probability that R puts on the claim being true, and r is the probability that R puts on Q being informed, but the statement being false. Alternatively, R can research the claim. If he finds it is true, he can accept the offer or reject it. He might accept itifb + h-P^ Max [b + h -k,d(b + h) ], and will definitely reject it otherwise. If he discovers that the claim is false, then he will reject it and get payoff Max [h,d(rbl(l -q) is needed for R to be willing to accept the offer after research, and that
q{b + h -P) + (1 -q)Max[h,d(rb/(l -q) + h)] -d a Max[M((<? + r)b + h)]
is needed for R to be willing to do research on an offer. This condition reduces to
P^b + h + (l-q)hlq -(1 -q)Max[h,d(rb + /i)/(l -q)] -Max[h,d((q + r)b + h] -d.
Using the fact that r + q < 1, the right-hand side is maximized at r = 1 -q, so that
P < (b + h) + (1 -q)hlq -Max[/i,<5(^ + h)]lq -dlq.
If h 2= 6{qb + h), then this means that P == b -dig. If h < d(qb + h), then h < qbl{\ -6), and P < b{\ -d) + (1 -5)hlq -dlq, which together imply P < b-dlq. Thus, P< b -dlq, which is maximized at q = 1. Thus, P < b -d. Combining this with the above result, we see that an informational claim will be accepted in equilibrium only if
Since Q, if informed, can always get b -Max [h,d(b + h) ] by buying the factory, this means that Q will always offer to buy the factory if she can do better than both no offer and revealing her information, so Q will buy the factory if b -Max [h,d(b + h) ] > Max [O,Min[fc -d,(\ -d) 
Proof of Result 2.2
See Proof of Result 1.2.
Inkxmation and the CorUrol of Productive Assets 75
Proof of Result 3.1 R must accept any offer to buy the factory for price P < Max [h,6(b + h) ], as argued in Proof of Result 1.1. Also, as shown in Proof of Result 1.1, as p -* 0, the maximum wage that Q could get for working for R goes to 0. Thus, if b -Max[h,d(b + h) ] > 0, there exists a p such that there does not exist an equilibrium in which Q works for R at a wage. Does there exist an equilibrium in which an informed Q purchases the action that she knows to be productive? Suppose there did. If R accepts an offer for Q to purchase activity a, at price P > 0, then only type s t would make that offer All other types would earn negative payoff if it is accepted by R, and zero payoff otherwise. Therefore, R will have beliefs probability = 1 that an offer to buy activity a, is coming from type s r She will then accept the offer if and only ifP + h > Max [h,b + h -k,d(b + h) ]. Thus, there does not exist an equilibrium in which an informed Q gets more than Thus, when the conditions of Result 3.1 hold, no such equilibrium exists.
A PBE meeting Assumptions 1 and 2 exists in which Q offers to buy the factory at price P = Max[/2,(5(fc + h)], and any offer by Q to buy the activity for P > Max [b -k,d(b + h) Suppose that Q offers to purchase activity a,-for price P. R will accept the offer if P + h> Max[h,q(b -k) + h,d({q + r) 
where q is R's beliefs about the probability that Q is of type s t , and r is the probability that Q is informed but not of type s ( . The right-hand side is maximized when q = 1, so that R will accept any such offer when P > Max [£ + h -k,6 b -Max[h,d(b + h) ], Q will never buy the factory. Depending on the level of p, she may instead offer to work for R or to purchase the activity a t , but in either case R will retain control of the factory and efficient production will take place when Q is informed.
